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Abstract. This paper proposes a novel model-based approach to combine the 
quantitative dependability (safety, reliability, availability, maintainability and IT 
security) analysis and trade-off analysis. The proposed approach is called DPN 
(Dependability Priority Numbers) and allows the comparison of different actual 
dependability characteristics of a systems with its target values and evaluates 
them regarding trade-off analysis criteria. Therefore, the target values of system 
dependability characteristics are taken as requirements, while the actual value of 
a specific system design are provided by quantitative and qualitative dependabil-
ity analysis (FHA, FMEA, FMEDA, of CFT-based FTA). The DPN approach 
evaluates the fulfillment of individual target requirements and perform trade-offs 
between analysis objectives. We present the workflow and meta-model of the 
DPN approach, and illustrate our approach using a case study on a brake warning 
contact system. Hence, we demonstrate how the model-based DPNs improve sys-
tem dependability by selecting the project crucial dependable design alternatives 
or measures. 
Keywords: Dependability analysis, safety, reliability, availability, maintaina-
bility, IT security, trade-off analysis, component fault tree (CFT), Functional 
Hazard Analysis, FMEDA. 
1 Introduction 
Ref. [9] defines dependability of a system is the ability to avoid service failures that are 
more frequent and more severe than is acceptable and it contains the following prop-
erties: safety, reliability, availability, integrity (security), and maintainability. Depend-
ability trade-off analysis is basically the analysis of dependencies and conflicts between 
dependability properties according to the fulfillment of targets and to make trade-offs 
among these properties [1][2][8][11][13]. Quantitative dependability analysis deals 
with quantitative analysis of safety, reliability, availability, maintainability and security 
properties of a system design. Examples are Failure mode Effect Diagnostic Analysis 
(FMEDA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) etc. Currently the trade-off analysis of the de-
pendability properties assumes in many cases that the target values to be fulfilled by 
the design alternatives, and actual values that the design alternatives hold, are given. 
Based on these values, acceptable limits and evaluation criteria, trade-off analyses are 
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performed. However, the actual quantitative values of dependability properties of de-
sign alternatives in many cases are not given and need to be obtained. The techniques 
to perform (model-based) quantitative dependability analysis and to perform trade-off 
analysis are usually performed separately, or in other words, they are not combined 
sufficiently for effective quantitative dependability trade-off analysis.  
In this work we describe with Dependability Priority Numbers (DPN) an approach 
to combine these two engineering fields and show how model-based quantitative de-
pendability analysis techniques such as Component Fault Trees [10] can help to per-
form dependability trade-off analysis.  
This paper is arranged in the following sections: Section 2 provides an overview of 
related work, Section 3 illustrates an approach, which is named Dependability Priority 
Number (DPN); Section 4 shows a case study on a brake warning contact system; Sec-
tion 5 concludes this paper.  
2 Related Work 
Typically, the comparison of different design alternatives is the objective of dependa-
bility trade-off analysis. The design alternative that fulfills more dependability proper-
ties will be normally chosen as the solution. Today, there are some approaches to model 
the obtained dependability properties, e.g. through GSN [2], Modelica [6] etc., but the 
source of the quantitative value of the overall dependability is seldomly handled. 
Ref. [1] uses vulnerability attack graph and goal graph to determine the dependencies 
between the security goals and tasks. This method mentions the use of trade-off analysis 
parameters such as risk acceptance criteria, standards, laws, regulations, policies, stake-
holder goals, budget, and time-to-market. Ref. [2] utilizes DDA (Dependability Devia-
tion Analysis) and GSN (Goal Structuring Notation) to perform trade-off analysis. This 
method uses GSN with acceptable limits to model the fulfillment of the design alterna-
tives under certain scenarios. Ref. [3] emphasizes the role of scenarios and upper and 
lower bounds of acceptable limits in the trade-off analysis that is illustrated in [2]. Ref. 
Ref. [4] proposes a quantitative estimation method of the different dependability prop-
erties, in which expert estimations of the fulfillment of dependability properties are 
used. Ref. Ref. [5] uses an UML extension to describes the dependability properties 
and uses Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Net to perform dependability modelling. 
Ref. [6] uses Modelica and Bayesian Network simulation to identify the violence of the 
dependability requirements. Ref. [7] presents a trade-off analysis procedure to prioritize 
the different dependability requirements. 
Ref. [7][11][12] proposed formulas to calculate the utility or value function of de-
pendability of individual design alternatives. Ref. [7] uses product of weight and values 
function results to calculate the evaluation result of dependability properties such as 
performance, security and fault tolerance. For the calculation they use the following 
formulas: 
 
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
1
𝑛
[∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ] 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛   for without weight 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
1
𝑛
[∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ] w𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑎𝑖 = 1, 𝑎𝑖 > 0   for with weight    (1) 
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Ref. [11] defines the dependability properties evaluation results as 𝑥𝑖 and takes the 
sum of value function of 𝑥𝑖 as the result of the overall dependability value. In addition, 
they use the sum of the products of the weights of the individual properties and their 
evaluation results of 𝑥𝑖 as the dependability value. The authors argue that the sum of 
the weights of dependability properties shall be 1: 
 
𝑣(𝑥1, 𝑥2,…,𝑥𝑛) = 𝑣(𝑥1) + 𝑣(𝑥2) + ⋯+ 𝑣(𝑥𝑛) = ∑ 𝑣(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
   
or  
                        𝑣 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 
𝑛
𝑘=1  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑𝑤𝑖 = 1                         (2) 
 
The decision-making procedure according to this work includes the following steps:  
identification of the subjective such as design alternatives; definition of the analysis 
criteria; Performance of the evaluation; selection of the value function and determina-
tion of combinable criteria. The precondition of the combining the criteria is that the 
criteria are mutual independent, and it is possible to determine the final equation for 
calculating the value of fulfillment of dependability properties. Ref. [1][12] proposed 
the following essential definitions for dependability evaluation: Preference function 
based on certainty (such as probability) is defined as value function, preference function 
based on risk (such as weights) is defined as a utility function. In [12], weights of a 
criteria/properties 𝑤(𝑖) and value of this criteria 𝑣(𝑖)  are used to calculate utility of al-
ternatives: 
      𝑣 =∑ 𝑤(𝑖)𝑣(𝑖) 
𝑖
    or    𝑣 =∑ 𝑝(𝑖)𝑣(𝑖) 
𝑖
 where p denotes probability         (3) 
 
Ref. [8] illustrates an approach by use of GSN and its evaluation process to perform 
the trade-off analysis of dependability properties. The following aspects are essential 
to perform the trade-off analysis for this survey: goals of stakeholders; function for 
scenarios; related dependability properties; target value of dependability properties; 
traceability to the requirements; acceptance criteria; determination of compromise re-
gion. According to their work, the scenarios (consist of stimuli, responses) and target / 
limit are essential for performing trade-off analysis. However, in this paper, the use of 
the dependability analyses is not illustrated in detail. Ref. [13] handles the trade-off 
analysis in a very thorough way.  They proposed the following processes: identification 
of the concern of trade-analysis; definition of the deviation and failures; derivation of 
dependability requirements; identification of goals, target and limits; identification of 
alternatives; identification of trade-off argument based on GSN; evaluation of alterna-
tives and decision making. The evaluation of the alternatives is done based on evalua-
tion of the related criteria. The final value is produced with consideration of the weight. 
Matrix calculation is used for this evaluation process. The qualitative safety analysis 
techniques such as Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Ef-
fect Analysis (FMEA) are used for identifying the failures and further the dependability 
requirements. However, such analysis techniques are not reused to analyze the alterna-
tives and the model-based quantitative safety analysis is not used in their work. [14] 
proposes a method to address the cost-benefit trade-off analysis. The following 
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evaluation criteria are considered as essential: priorities; standards; laws; regulations; 
business goals; budget; policies. Taking a retrospective look at the related works, we 
can draw the conclusion that the dependability trade-off analysis were performed with-
out integrating the model-based quantitative dependability analysis techniques.  
3 Dependability Priority Numbers 
In this section, we present the concept of Dependability Priority Numbers (DPN). 
First, the result of this approach and its formula are described. Afterwards the workflow 
of DPN analyses is presented in detail. Moreover, the metamodel and its usage will be 
depicted. 
By introducing a Dependability Priority Number, analysis object is extended from 
design alternatives to at least alternatives and the measures for mitigating hazard or risk 
will be analyzed. They will be analyzed qualitatively and/or quantitatively towards an 
overall result of the quality of the system in terms of dependability. The overall fulfill-
ment of the dependability properties is presented by comparing the actual and expected 
DPN and also by comparison between the actual DPNs. The conflicts and dependencies 
between the dependability properties will be identified or solved during this process 
implicitly. 
In this work, we use first the concept of weights to calculate the overall dependability 
value. Therefore, the utility values will be calculated according to the definition in [11]. 
However, the calculation of DPN can also be based on risk / probability. The result of 
the calculation of the utilities/values of the alternatives is named the Dependability Pri-
ority Number (DPN) (instead of using the rather general term, Utility or Value.). Be-
cause the result deals in deed with the prioritization of the alternatives, and this priori-
tization has certain similarity with the Risk Priority Number. Based on [11][7][12], the 
following formula is derived:  
DPNj = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
                           (4) 
Where 
𝑛 : number of the dependability properties; 
𝑋𝑖𝑗: Evaluation result, correlates with acceptance level. If Xij: 0: totally unacceptable, 
1: totally acceptable. “i” for the index of dependability properties, “j” for alternatives / 
measures;    
𝐾𝑖: weight (or probability) coefficient of the individual dependability properties, ac-
cording to the importance of current dependability properties. Σi Ki  not necessarily 
equals to 1 
 
DPN uses a slightly changed formula of (1), (2) and (3) which are presented in Sec-
tion 2. The 𝑤𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖  is replaced by weight (or probability) coefficient 𝐾𝑖, basically they 
are all the weights (except that 𝑘𝑖   can contain probability additionally). The difference 
of 𝐾𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑤𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖 is that the sum of the weight coefficients 𝐾𝑖 used for DPN is not 
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necessarily 1, this definition has the benefit for tracing back the causing property intu-
itionally in case of changing of overall DPNs. This means, that if the DPN is changed 
for example from 109.11 to 111.11, (assume the utilized weights are 100, 10, 1, 0.1 and 
0.01 for safety, reliability, availability etc.) we know therefore in this case there is an 
improvement on the reliability (improvement on the second digit). The weight  𝐾𝑖 are 
generally determined by the domain expert according to the importance of the depend-
ability properties. The selection of weights follows additionally the rule of distinguish-
ing dependability properties big enough so that the weights of properties do not coun-
terweight in case value changes.  The weights can also be derived based on results of 
dependability analysis such as RPN out of FMEA or failure rates out of FTA. The result 
of DPN as simple numbers offers an intuitive and direct way to represent the overall 
fulfillment of the dependability goal and to compare variants.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Workflow to determine Dependability Priority Number 
In Fig. 1.  the workflow for determining Dependability Priority Numbers is illustrated. 
This workflow contains: 
1. Elicitation of the goals of the stakeholders. Here the typical goal graph methods, 
such as GSN [2], i* [1] for Non-Functional Requirements etc. can be used. A coarse 
trade-off analysis among the identified goals can be performed, in order to identify 
the possible limits, dependencies and conflicts.  
2. Based on the identified goals, the relevant scenarios with certain execution se-
quences will be determined. An example of such scenarios is robot x shall be 
stopped when safety bumper is engaged. Scenarios define the aims and scope of the 
trade-off analysis.  
Functional 
requirement
Functional FHA or FMEA
Trade-off 
analysis
alternative 
FMEA
Alternative 
FMEDA
Alternative 
(C)FT
Alternative SFF𝑥
Alternative  𝑥, 
MTTF𝑥, A𝑥, MDT𝑥
etc.
Alternative   𝑥, 
SIL𝑥
Alternative analysis
Measure(s)
Determination of
Dependability Priority
Number   𝑖𝑗 =∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
Trade-off criteria
DPN, 
acceptance,  
decision,  
prioritization
Architecture
Design artifact, 
failure rate etc.
Additional 
engineering 
phases…
Goal
Scenario
Maintenance
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3. Typically, the functional requirements will be elicited based on the identified sce-
narios. If there are no standardized requirements and their THR, the functional re-
quirements are to be elicited for the specific project.  
4. Based on the identified functional requirements, the Functional Hazard Analysis 
(FHA) or function-based Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
will be performed. The corresponding hazards, their Risk Priority Numbers (RPN), 
their Safety Integrity Level (SIL), and available measures will be identified. For 
fulfilling the predefined multiple quality goals (e.g. SIL) additional measures are to 
be identified. Traditionally only one measure is identified for fulfilling the prede-
fined quality goal. By using DPN multiple measures will be identified by use of the 
dependability analysis repeatedly.  
5. Trade-off analysis will be performed among alternative measures.  If there are no 
further information about the system components and their failure rates, the quali-
tative FMEA or Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) will be performed repeatedly, 
where the improvements of the quality in SIL or RPN of the alternative could be 
compared with the original (first) measure. The possible conflicts to other depend-
ability properties could be identified by observing the interchanging of DPNs. In 
these steps of trade-off analysis, the expert estimation is required. The following 
trade-off analysis is to be performed based on the trade-off criteria (based on 
[2][8][11][13][14]):  
o Determination of actual value of dependability properties 𝑣𝑎; 
o Determination and comparison of target/expected value 𝑣𝑒 with 𝑣𝑎;  
o Determination and comparing of acceptable upper / lower limit with 𝑣𝑎 ;  
o Evaluation of the benefit of actual better value e.g. (𝑣𝑎 ≥ 𝑣𝑒) / drawback of 
actual worse value e.g. (𝑣𝑎 < 𝑣𝑒);  
o Determination of the cost of improvement towards expected value e.g. (𝑣𝑎 <
𝑣𝑒); 
o Determination of time-to-achievement of the improvement e.g. (𝑣𝑎 < 𝑣𝑒);;  
o Determination of overall acceptance 𝑋𝑖𝑗;   
o Derivation of further action 
6. The actual value in the trade-off criteria could be obtained by FHA, Risk Priority 
Number through FMECA qualitatively or quantitatively by the FMEDA, (Compo-
nent) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Fault Tree Analysis (FT) or other quantitative 
dependability techniques.   
The results of such dependability assessments / analyses will be used for the rest of 
quantitative dependability trade-off analysis: Failure rate 𝜆 and SIL for the safety prop-
erty, Mean Time Between/To Failure (MTBF/MTTF) for the reliability property, Avail-
ability value for the availability property, Mean Down Time for the maintainability etc. 
After determining measures and alternatives, they are modelled by a model-based 
(Component) Fault Tree. The results of these analyses are then compared between each 
of the system design alternatives. For Safety the calculated failure rate 𝜆 and even qual-
itative RPN, SIL are used as „actual value“, “expected value” is typically predefined 
either by the authorities or by the references systems. 
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By using FMEDA for determining Safe Failure Fraction (for estimation of the Safety 
Integrity Level) and dangerous undetected failures, the FMEDA will be performed sev-
eral times according to the number of alternatives. The calculated SFFs, failure rates 
and the corresponding SILs will be then be used as actual value for the trade-off anal-
ysis. In case the new measure neither leads to architecture changes, nor to a structural 
update in the fault tree, the changed availability can still be captured by e.g. the changed 
Mean Down Time. For example, if stopping the train in case of warning contact “high” 
(warning contact is responsible for worn out status of the brake), affects the availability 
too negatively (unacceptable) and the measure of “stop” has no remarkable improve-
ment of safety, in addition “low speed drive” is sufficient (regarding safety) to handle 
this warning contact. The “low speed” can then be used to replace “stop” as measure in 
case of warning contact “high”. This change will obviously improve the availability of 
the train, and without compromise of the safety. This change does not necessarily 
change the fault tree structure of the train. But down time will be then reduced. The 
reduced down time will affect the calculation of availability positively because of 𝐴 =
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹+𝑀𝐷𝑇
 for repairable systems. Through this way the availability comparison be-
tween the original solution “stop” and new solution “low speed drive” can be done even 
without changing the structure of the fault tree.  
In DPN the quantitative analysis techniques such as the FTA and FMEDA are reused 
to calculate the influence of different alternatives on the overall system. Different sys-
tem failure rates could be observed, because of different architectures or even different 
value of the parameter. The comparison of alternatives is performed regarding trade-
off criteria.  
Partially according to the industrial practice, there are for instance the following cat-
egories for the subjective trade-off criteria to be used for evaluating the alternatives: 
• Benefit of the actual better value: None; Better life time cause of better quality; Bet-
ter reliability or availability of the system; Potential reputation benefit; Eventually 
better sale price. 
• Drawback of the actual worse value: None; No certificate; Financial disaster; Worse 
availability; Damage of reputation; Postpone of the project finish time; Increased 
purchase cost. 
• Cost for improvement towards expected value: None; Ignorable; Proportional; Quite 
high; Too high. 
• Time for achieving the expected value: None; Ignorable; Proportional; Quite long; 
Too long. 
• Further action: None; Redundancy; Use of higher quality component; Development 
of new component. 
• Acceptance level: 0: totally unacceptable; 0.2: almost unacceptable; 0.4: predomi-
nantly unacceptable; 0.6: predominantly acceptable; 0.8: almost acceptable; 1: to-
tally acceptable 
The overall acceptance (between 0 and 1) is represented by the value of 𝑋𝑖𝑗, together 
with estimated value 𝐾𝑖. Based on these values DPNs are be calculated (according to 
(4)). Afterwards, the DPNs of different design alternatives are compared. The higher 
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value means basically the better dependability. And the detailed comparison according 
to the single dependability properties can also be done. The comparison shall not only 
be done based on the subjective evaluation value, but also on the objective calculated 
value.  Based on the such comparisons, the acceptance of the alternative can be deter-
mined. The mutual dependency, the conflicts are represented through the interchanging 
of evaluation (or calculated) values. For example if DPN changes from 111.10 to 
110.11 directly, we know that there is a conflict between availability and security. Be-
cause increase of the security (from 0 to 1) causes decrease of the availability (from 1 
to 0).   DPN are calculated for instance in the following way: assume safety has the 
weight of 100, reliability has the weight of 10 and so on. And the 𝑋𝑖𝑗 all have value “1” 
for totally acceptance. The expected Dependability Priority Number would be 
   𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 100 ∗ 1 + 10 ∗ 1 + ⋯ = 111.11. This expected value is then used to 
compare with the actual values.  
 
Fig. 2. Metamodel of the Dependability Priority Number 
As illustrated in the Fig. 2. , goal, scenario, and functional requirements are the bases 
of the trade-off analysis and define the subjects of the trade-off analysis. During the 
model-based dependability analysis, the following data are identified step by step by 
use of this meta model: 
• Malfunction, hazards are identified by use of e.g. FHA based on the functional re-
quirement. The limit of goals can be used as limit of underlying requirements for the 
further trade-off analysis;  
• Based on the hazard incl. its risk value the multiple measures are identified; 
• The trade-off analysis of alternative measures can be qualitative or quantitative. 
Qualitative trade-off analysis can be the repeated model-based FHA or FMEA 
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analyses for determining the reduced RPN or SIL by use of different measures. Such 
results are represented as   𝑖  and    𝑖 . Where the i indicates the sequential number 
representing each of the design variants. Quantitative trade-off analyses are per-
formed through repeated FMEDA or (C)FT for calculating the ℷ𝑖,    𝑖/   𝐵 𝑖 , 
𝐴𝑖,    𝑖 . Through the comparison of the ℷi and ℷi+1 the variant which is better in 
terms of safety or reliability can be identified. Further the comparison of aforemen-
tioned other values could contribute to an overall evaluation value of the dependa-
bility properties. 
• The calculation of the expected and actual values are performed by the equation (4) 
based on the evaluation of the trade-off criteria as mentioned in the workflow sec-
tion. The    𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  and    𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  are then used further to determine whether 
the   𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 ≥    𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑. If this is the case, all the dependability properties are 
fulfilled, otherwise a or some or even all the dependability properties are possibility 
not fulfilled. The not fulfilled dependability properties need basically further meas-
ure until this is fulfilled. In the end all the dependability properties shall be in general 
fulfilled. However, there can be conflicts by fulfilling the different properties, for 
example the fulfillment of safety properties means in certain circumstances the harm 
to the availability. This happens for example if a train is stopped for certain safety 
reason, but this means immediately the reduction of the availability. Compromise 
has to be made in this case. DPN result is shown at the bottom-right corner of  Fig. 
1. DPN approach consists of  both the process of Fig. 1. and the data set of Fig. 2. 
• Not only the measures, the quality goals and the functional requirements are the pos-
sible objects of the trade-off analysis but also the design artifacts and maintenance 
artifacts are also potential objects. Design artifacts offer among others the design 
alternative. Maintenance artifacts can be for instance the size of the maintenance 
team, possible maintenance strategy as conditions which also play roles in determin-
ing the maintenance priority number (basically the calculable Mean Down Time). 
By changes of dependa. goals, the DPN process shall be repeated totally or partially, 
according to the result of the similarity analysis between the old and new goals. 
4 Case study – Brake Warning Contact 
This section presents a case study form the railway domain based on a brake warning 
contact. The brake warning contact monitors the status of the brakes, if the thickness of 
brakes is detected less than allowed, a warning message will be sent to the dashboard, 
the train will be set to degraded mode. By using this example, the workflow of DPN is 
explained in detail: 
1. Performing FMECA:  
The following functional requirement has been identified: If the warning contact is 
high, the warning contact sensor shall send the warning signal to the dashboard and 
set the train to degraded mode.  Based on the identified function a FMECA is per-
formed and multiple measures (redundancy and monitoring are identified in Table 1). 
10 
Table 1. FMECA inclusive multiple measures 
Measure New 
RPN 
New  
Probab. 
New  
Detect. 
New  
Sever. 
Further 
Action 
measure 1: Redundant 
warning contact sensor  
56 1 7 8 no 
Measure 2: Monitoring of 
warning contact 
16 1 2 8 
 
2. Performing FMEDA:  
The FMEDA identifies the dangerous undetected failure rates of redundancy (5 fit, 
see Table 2). Moreover, the dangerous undetected failure rate of monitoring is 1, 
under the assumption that the monitoring detects 90% dangerous failure.  
Table 2. Results of FMEDA for multiple measures 
Detection and 
control measure 
Detection cov-
erage (DC) 
Failure rate of dan-
gerous undetected 
Failure rate of dan-
gerous detected 
Redundancy 50% 5 5 
Monitoring 90% 1 9 
3. Performing Component Fault Tree Analyses for the following design alternatives 
(measures): 
• Without measure: This fault tree contains only the components “power supply” and 
“brake warning contact” combined using an OR-gate. 
• With measure 1 of redundancy: The component “brake warning contact” is dou-
bled and because of the redundancy, the two instances are combined using an AND-
gate. This subtree with the AND-gate is then combined with the “power supply” 
component using an OR-gate. 
• With measure 2 of monitoring (3 variants with failure rate (FR) of 10000 fit, 10 
fit, and 1 fit): As illustrated in Fig. 3, the use of the monitoring mechanism introduces 
additional failure possibility, because the monitoring can also fail. In this case, the 
brake warning contact fails if 1) the monitoring fails and the brake warning contact 
(9 fit) dangerous detectable fails or 2) brake warning contact dangerous undetected 
fails (1 fit). The failure rate of monitoring mechanism plays here a significant role. 
10,000 fit, 10 fit and 1 fit are selected to perform this comparison in this case study. 
8760 hours (1 year) was used as mission time, 24 hours were used as Mean Down 
Time of the basic events. Based on such data, CFT-based dependability / Reliability 
Availability Maintenance Safety (RAMS) properties are modelled and calculated. 
The modelling of the CFT is performed using ComposR, a Siemens-internal model-
based safety and reliability analysis tool. The calculation is done using ZUSIM, a 
Siemens-internal safety and reliability calculation engines that has been used since 
decades.  
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Fig. 3. Component Fault Tree of the measure monitoring 
The goal of the quantitative analysis is to determine the measure which fulfills all (or 
more) the target values. In the CFT as depicted in Fig. 3, four components (power sup-
ply, brake warning contact dangerous undetected, brake warning contact dangerous de-
tected, monitoring) and two gates (one AND- and one OR-gates) are modeled. The 
analysis results of all 5 design alternatives are summarized in Table 3. The individual 
analysis results (such as failure rate) are used as actual failure rate which  serve as basis 
to be compared with the target/expected value. Other (reliability, availability etc.) ac-
tual and target values are also compared in the same way.  The following formulas are 
used to calculate MDT by use of ZUSIM:  for OR gate    𝑂𝑅 =
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹1∗𝑀𝐷𝑇2+ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹2∗𝑀𝐷𝑇11
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹1+ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹2
  and for AND gate   𝑂𝑅 =
𝑀𝐷𝑇1 ∗ 𝑀𝐷𝑇12
𝑀𝐷𝑇1+ 𝑀𝐷𝑇2
. 
Table 3. Summarized dependability calculation results of the measures by use of ZUSIM 
Result Without 
meas-
ure 
With re-
dundancy 
With moni-
toring  
FR: 
10000 fit 
With moni-
toring 
FR: 10 fit 
With monitor-
ing 
FR: 1 fit 
Availabil-
ity 
99,9999
800000
00% 
99,999999
99999% 
99,999995% 99,99999% 99,999995% 
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Unavaila-
bility 
2,40E-
07 
1,15E-13 4,81E-06 4,80E-06 4,80E-06 
MTBF (h) 1,00E+
08 
1,04E+14 4,98E+08 5,00E+08 5,00E+08 
Failure rate 
lambda 
(1/h) 
1,00E-
08 
1,00E-14 2,01E-09 2,00E-09 2,00E-09 
FIT 1,00E+
01 
9,60E-06 2,01E+00 2,00E+00 2,00E+00 
MDT (h) 24 12 23.95 24 24 
MTTF (h) 1,00E+
08 
1,00E+14 4,98E+08 5,00E+08 5,00E+08 
Mission 
time (h) 
8760 8760 8760 8760 8760 
 
Table 4 shows the comparison between the expected values and actual values of the 
respective dependability properties. In this case study, the acceptable limit is set to the 
expected value due to simplicity. Normally, the comparison is done between the ac-
ceptable limit and the actual values. This comparison describes the fulfillment of the 
dependability goals. The expected value of failure rate is set to 10 fit, this value is used 
5 times for comparison (5 corresponds to the number of measures). Compared with this 
value, the acceptance value of objective failure rates of different measures is obtained 
(e.g. 2 fit < 10 fit in Table 4). Afterwards, the subject evaluations will be performed. 
Such subjective evaluation offers additional but essential acceptance criterion. For ex-
ample, if reliability or availability target values cannot be totally fulfilled, it is important 
to know what the drawbacks of non-fulfillment are and what would be the cost and time 
to achieve the target value. Based on the objective comparison and these subjective 
comparisons of the measures regarding the aforementioned acceptance criteria, the 
overall acceptance (e.g. 1: total acceptance in Table 4) will be subjectively determined.  
Table 4. Objective and subjective evaluation of alternatives / measures (monitoring 1 fit) 
Solution  Measure monitoring 1 fit 
Failure rate / Hazard rate  
Actual value (fit) 2 
Expected value (fit) 10 
Acceptable upper limit (fit) 10 
Acceptable lower limit (fit)  
Evaluation of benefit of actual value Better reliability of availability of 
the system 
Evaluation of drawback of actual value None 
Cost of improvement towards expected value None 
Time-to-achievement of the improvement  
Overall acceptance  1: total acceptance 
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Fig. 4. Evaluation results according to the objective and subjective evaluation criteria 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of the actual DPN and expected DPN of alternatives / measures 
Table 5. Dependability Priority Number of measures / alternatives  
Statistic Without 
measure 
Measure 1  
(Redundancy) 
Measure 2  
(Monitoring: FR 1) 
Safety 80 100 100 
Reliability 8 10 10 
Availability 0,8 1 0,2 
Maintainability 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Security 0,01 0,01 0,01 
DPN 88.91 111.11 110.31 
 
Finally, the DPN is calculated based on this acceptance value and the respective weights 
of the properties according to ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖  
𝑛
𝑘=𝑖
.  For instance, the fifth measure of moni-
toring with failure rate of 1 fit fulfills the safety target value, but does not fulfill 
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availability expected value (0,2 as shown in Table 5.  and Fig. 4). Table 5.  shows the 
results of 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 . Therefore, the actual   𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒1 ∑ 𝑋𝑖1 ∗ 𝐾1 
𝑛
𝑘=𝑖 = (100 + 10 +
0.2 + 0.1 + 0.01) = 110.31 with 𝐾𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 = 100,  𝐾𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 10, 𝐾𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
1 𝑒𝑡.  The expected    𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒5 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖1 ∗ 𝐾1 
𝑛
𝑘=𝑖 = 
100*1+10*1+1*1+0.1*1+0.01*1=111.11. These two values are visualized in Fig. 5.  as 
the fifth points of each of the lines. The expected values of the alternatives are plotted 
as brown points, while the actual values the blue points. Obviously, this measure does 
not fulfill all the target values. In contrary, the 2nd measure, redundancy measure ful-
fills all the dependability targets. It has the highest actual DPN. The actual DPN of this 
measure is on the same level as the expected DPN. The actual DPNs of other measures 
are lower than the expected DPNs (shown as blue points under brown points). Fig. 4.  
also shows the comparison of changes of the dependability properties. By this for in-
stance a conflict between safety and availability is identified. By keeping the safety on 
the same high value, the availability goes down by monitoring with 10000 fit (3rd meas-
ure) dramatically. However, this conflict is not handled further, because the 2nd meas-
ure was chosen as solution. Otherwise a trade-off must be found and according to the 
changed DPNs the optimal alternative is selected. Basically the more important prop-
erty wins. Through this case study, the strength of the DPN is illustrated. Quantitative 
dependability analysis (CFT) is thereby integrated into dependability trade-off analysis 
and vice verse. This combination improves the dependability of the system and reduces 
the cost of ignorable conflicts between the dependability goals.  
5 Conclusion  
This work illustrates how the concept of Dependability Priority Numbers (DPN) sup-
ports quantitively trade-off analyses. DPN helps to select of the optimal system design 
alternative or measure, in order to fulfill dependability goals. Dependencies and con-
flicts can be identified and resolved inherently by using this approach. DPN brings 
model-based dependability analysis and trade-off analysis together. An exemplary case 
study illustrates the concept and benefits of DPN. Our approach supports not only the 
quantitative trade-off analysis, but also extending model-based quantitative dependa-
bility analysis towards trade-off analysis.  
DPN will be further developed both conceptually and according to tool support. 
More quantitative and detailed acceptance evaluation criteria, utilization of effective 
pre-selection algorithm in case of handling of large number of alternatives, calculation 
of object and subject acceptance values towards DPN in a more effective way will be 
investigated in the future. 
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